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1. Introduction  
Interest in just war theory has boomed in recent years, as a revisionist school of thought 
has challenged the orthodoxy of international law, most famously defended by Michael 
Walzer [1977]. These revisionist critics have targeted the two central principles governing 
the conduct of war (jus in bello): combatant equality and noncombatant immunity.1 The first 
states that combatants face the same permissions and constraints whether their cause is just 
or unjust. The second protects noncombatants from intentional attack. In response to 
these critics, some philosophers have defended aspects of the old orthodoxy on novel 
grounds.2 Revisionists counter. As things stand, the prospects for progress are remote.  
In this paper, we offer a way forward. We argue that exclusive focus on first-order 
moral principles, such as combatant equality and noncombatant immunity, has led 
revisionist and orthodox just war theorists to engage in ‘proxy battles’. Their first-order 
moral disagreements are at least partly traceable to second-order disagreements about the 
nature and purpose of political theory. These deeper disputes have been central to the 
broader discipline of political theory for several years; we hope that bringing them to bear 
on the ethics of war will help us move beyond the present impasse.  
In particular, we focus on two second-order questions. 
 
• The site question: Should fundamental principles of jus in bello concern institutional 
design or individual conduct?  
• The feasibility question: What real-world facts, if any, should constrain the demands of 
jus in bello?  
 
In each case, our analysis comes in two parts. We first summarize the relevant debate in 
political theory, and illustrate how it underpins the controversy between revisionist and 
orthodox just war theorists. We then show how this novel framing advances first-order 




bello, our analysis points towards a fruitful middle ground between revisionists’ moral 
rigorism and orthodox theorists’ fidelity to the laws of war. 
Before we start, two caveats. While our approach should illuminate all areas of just 
war theory, we focus only on jus in bello. Furthermore, by saying that orthodox and 
revisionist theorists have engaged in ‘proxy battles’ we do not mean that a given approach 
to the site of justice or to feasibility constraints automatically induces a first-order view about 
war. We only suggest that different second-order stances about the site of justice and 
feasibility help us both to explain the substantive disagreements between orthodox and 
revisionist just war theorists, and to move beyond them.  
2. The Site of Justice and Just War Theory 
In this section, we first outline the political theory debate on the site of justice, and then 
draw parallels with recent disputes between orthodox and revisionist just war theorists. 
This novel framing will allow us, in Section 3, to point to a number of important 
implications for jus in bello. 
2.1 The Site of Justice: Political vs Non-political Approaches 
Much contemporary political theory expounds principles of socio-economic justice. These set 
out individuals’ entitlements to particular bundles of socio-economic opportunities and 
resources within a social system. Unsurprisingly, scholars disagree about the content of 
these principles. For instance, some defend distributive equality, others distributive 
sufficiency, others still support whichever distribution maximally benefits the most 
deprived (e.g., Frankfurt [1997]; Parfit [2000]). Although much ink has been spilled on the 
first-order moral question of what justice demands, theorists of justice have also been 
sensitive to the equally important second-order question of the ‘site of justice’: the 
particular subject to which principles of justice apply.   
Two competing approaches have emerged, which we call ‘political’ and ‘non-
political’.3 Political approaches hold that, at the fundamental level, principles of justice 
apply to the most important legal, political, and economic institutions within any given 
social system, and only derivatively to individuals. Non-political approaches, by contrast, 
hold that fundamental principles of justice apply directly to the conduct of individual 
human beings.  
 John Rawls is the most prominent proponent of the political approach (Rawls 




social institutions’, and his principles of socio-economic justice—fair equality of 
opportunity and the difference principle4—are meant to guide us in selecting between 
different possible configurations of the ‘basic structure of society’, namely society’s main 
institutions. As A.J. Julius puts it, for Rawlsians,  
 
to conclude that a society is just or unjust, I don’t have to know what everyone in the 
society is doing. It’s enough that I know how the society’s institutions are arranged, or that 
I understand the basic framework that shapes its members’ interaction over time or the 
basic mechanisms that distribute them over a range of prospects for living better and worse 
lives (Julius [2003: 321]). 
 
Justice, on this view, is a property of institutional systems, and its bearing on individuals’ 
conduct is indirect. The demands of justice binding individuals derive from principles for 
institutional design. In particular, when institutions are fully just, individuals’ duties of 
justice are exhausted by the demands institutions place on them (i.e., by the law); when 
institutions are unjust, individuals have duties of justice to reform them.  
To be sure, on the political approach, individuals in a complex social system do 
face other moral demands besides institutionally mediated ones. That is, they not only face 
moral demands of justice ‘as citizens’—i.e., as participants in legal, political and economic 
institutions—but also as friends, parents, workers and so forth (Rawls [1996: 262]). But, at 
least under ideal circumstances where a just background is in place, these further demands 
do not conflict with those of justice; instead, justice sets the boundaries within which we 
may legitimately honor our other moral obligations.5  
Philosophers like G.A. Cohen [1997] and Liam Murphy [1998] reject the political 
approach, arguing that, at the fundamental level, justice applies to individuals’ actions and 
behavior.6 Institutions are, in turn, means to achieving ends the worth of which is to be 
judged by appeal to principles for individual conduct. In Murphy’s words:  
 
any plausible overall political/moral view must, at the fundamental level, evaluate the 
justice of institutions with normative principles that apply also to people’s choices. We 
should not think of legal, political, and other social institutions as together constituting a 
separate normative realm, requiring separate normative first principles, but rather primarily 
as the means that people employ the better to achieve their collective political/moral goals 





On this view, the particular ‘oughts’ (e.g., laws) embedded in a given institutional scheme 
derive from moral principles that apply directly to individuals. Non-political theorists are 
not always fully transparent about how to effect this derivation. Two options are available. 
The first is to require the demands embedded in institutions to mirror the principles of 
justice that apply to individual conduct.7 An obvious difficulty with this option is that so 
arranging one’s institutions might be counter-productive. For example, if fundamental 
moral principles are epistemically and/or substantively too demanding, their direct 
embodiment in institutional rules may result in widespread, perhaps catastrophic non-
compliance. 
 This concern motivates the second option, which consists in developing principles for 
institutional regulation, which are geared towards the realization of the values underlying 
fundamental moral principles. As G.A. Cohen understands them, principles of institutional 
regulation do not reflect the moral truth. Instead, they are means to achieving certain 
results, which should be adopted ‘in light of an evaluation […of their] likely effects, and, 
therefore, in light of an understanding of the facts’ (Cohen [2008: 265]).8 
To illustrate, we may think that the following ‘luck-egalitarian’ principle is a true 
demand of justice: individuals ought to act so as to eliminate the effects of brute luck on 
each others’ lives. However, we also recognize that designing institutions in light of this 
principle would be a bad idea. First, determining what equalizing the effects of brute luck 
on people’s lives requires is extremely epistemically burdensome. Second, even if the 
demands of this principle were institutionalized, due to selfish motives, individuals would 
refuse to act on them. This renders our principle a poor candidate for institutional 
regulation. A better alternative could be the Rawlsian principle that one ought to maximize 
the position of the socio-economically worst off, since this would incentivize the talented 
to be maximally productive. Arguably, selecting institutions—e.g., a tax scheme—on the 
basis of this principle would better serve the mitigation of the effects of brute luck on 
people’s lives than selecting them directly on the basis of the ‘true’ demands of justice 
(Cohen [2008: 286]).9  
So far, we have outlined two contrasting approaches to the site of principles of 
justice: political and non-political. To sum up, these approaches crucially differ in how they 
characterize the relationship between: 
 
a) moral demands that apply to individuals; 




c) institutional demands that apply to individuals. 
 
On the political approach, fundamental principles of justice are of type (b), and the 
demands of justice that apply to individuals are exhausted by institutional ones (c). On this 
approach, demands of type (a) are an empty set in the realm of justice. The most 
fundamental layer of justice-morality is (b). On the non-political approach, by contrast, 
fundamental demands of justice are of type (a), and the institutional demands that apply to 
individuals (c) either mirror moral ones, or are derived from principles for institutional 
regulation (b) that ‘serve’ the values underlying the moral demands at level (a).  
What does the distinction between these two approaches have to offer to debates 
about jus in bello? 
2.2 Jus in Bello and the Site of Justice 
When it comes to jus in bello, we care about all normative principles that govern the conduct 
of war, rather than norms of justice strictly conceived. Still, the ‘site question’ arises all the 
same and underpins some of the main first-order disagreements between orthodox and 
revisionist just war theorists. Bringing the distinction between political and non-political 
approaches to bear on these disagreements can thus help us better frame and understand 
them.  
 Political approaches to the just conduct of war hold that, at the fundamental level, 
principles of jus in bello apply to the institutions that govern armed conflict: they allow us to 
select the ‘morally correct’ laws of war. In turn, whatever set of laws is recommended by 
these principles exhausts the just-war-related permissions and prohibitions applying to 
combatants. This fully mirrors the structure of the political approach in relation to socio-
economic justice. 
Many orthodox just war theorists—who defend combatant equality and non-
combatant immunity, in line with the existing laws of war—appear to endorse the political 
approach. There are two broad camps, each defending a distinctive substantive principle 
for institutional design. The first justifies the institutions governing armed conflict on rule 
consequentialist grounds, by appeal to a general principle mandating the minimization of 
harm. Henry Shue [2008] most prominently advocates this position, which was also 
defended in Brandt [1972]; Mavrodes [1975]; Buchanan and Keohane [2004]; Buchanan 
[2006]; Shaw [2011]; Dill and Shue [2012]; Shue [2013]; Jenkins [2014]	 . The second strand 
holds that justified laws of war result from a fair and mutually advantageous hypothetical 




whereby combatants waive their rights against one another to grant each other the license 
to obey the military orders of their state. This view is most associated with Yitzhak Benbaji 
[2008] and Daniel Statman [2014].10 Independently of these differences, however, these two 
groups of theorists hold that fundamental principles of jus in bello concern the selection of 
morally justified laws of war.  
 Non-political approaches to the just conduct of war, by contrast, hold that, at the 
fundamental level, jus in bello specifies moral principles that apply directly to individual 
combatants, and to their military and political leaders. A war is fought justly only if these 
individuals adhere to the dictates of the moral principles that apply to them. Like their 
counterparts in the socio-economic justice debate, non-political just war theorists think that 
we should derive—in more or less direct ways—the institutional rules governing armed 
conflict from these fundamental moral principles.  
At a first pass, the non-political approach seems to underpin the revisionist critique 
of orthodox just war theory. Many revisionist arguments challenge traditional principles of 
jus in bello by appealing to the demands of interpersonal morality. As revisionists have 
argued in detail, according to ordinary interpersonal morality it is very hard to see how 
combatants advancing an unjust cause could be morally permitted to intentionally kill just 
combatants, or to kill noncombatants as unintended side-effects of pursuing their unjust 
goals.11 Combatant equality, as it is conceived in the laws of war, cannot track combatants’ 
interpersonal moral duties. There is more dispute over noncombatant immunity, but most 
revisionists think that it, too, lacks foundations in interpersonal morality, since 
noncombatants can be responsible for contributing to unjustified threats, and this 
responsibility grounds liability to be killed.12  
Although revisionists discuss the institutional implications of their views only 
cursorily, they hold that the laws of war should derive, in more or less complex ways, from 
interpersonal moral demands. In particular, some think the laws of war should mirror 
interpersonal morality. For example, David Rodin [2011] has argued that his rights-based 
account of permissible killing should be directly implemented in the laws of war: killing is 
permissible if and only if either the target has lost the protection of his right to life, or 
killing him is a (rare) justified lesser evil. Helen Frowe [2011: 45] has tentatively endorsed 
this thesis, arguing against licensing wrongful harm in order to minimize it.  
A second set of revisionist theorists hold that the laws of war should be selected on 
the basis of principles for institutional regulation that take account of the values embedded 




enforcement of [given] laws or conventions’ (McMahan [2004: 730]).13  Acknowledging 
that straightforward legal implementation of combatants’ interpersonal moral duties and 
permissions would have bad consequences, Jeff McMahan [2008] concludes that the laws 
of war should be based on the principle that one ought to minimize wrongful harm (note the 
subtle contrast with Shue and Dill, whose aim is to minimize all harm)14 Cécile Fabre [2009: 
39] also expresses sympathy for this view, on grounds similar to McMahan’s.  
2.3 Concluding Remarks 
As our discussion has shown, second-order disagreements about the site of fundamental 
principles of jus in bello underpin first-order disputes over the moral equality of combatants 
and noncombatant immunity. The first-order dispute is, at least in part, a proxy battle, 
fought by theorists whose disagreements run much deeper. Orthodox just war theorists 
tend to endorse a political approach. Revisionist just war theorists lean towards versions of 
the non-political approach. For this debate to make progress, we must settle the underlying 
second-order question. Otherwise just war theorists will talk past each other: political just 
war theorists might develop the most plausible account of the institutional norms 
governing war; non-political just war theorists might develop the most plausible account of 
our interpersonal moral duties; but their proposals would not strictly compete, because 
each presupposes an approach to the site of normative theorizing about war that the others 
reject. Indeed, quite strikingly, once we hold a given site constant, orthodox and revisionist 
just-war theorists appear to largely agree at the level of substance. The following table 
summarizes the findings of this section. 
 




3. The Site of Justice and Just War Theory: Implications  
So far, we have observed that orthodox and revisionist just-war theorists’ disagreement 
about first-order questions is partly accounted for by their disagreement about what the site 
of fundamental principles of jus in bello should be. In this section, we outline the 
implications of this observation. We highlight that both political and non-political 
approaches to jus in bello face important challenges, and gesture at possible responses to 
them. These in turn cast doubt on the plausibility of orthodox and revisionist stances on jus 
in bello, pointing instead to a ‘middle ground’ between them.  
3.1 Challenges to the Political Approach 
The political approach underpins orthodox just war theory and, in its purest form, states 
that one’s obligations and permissions in war are exhausted by those set out by the morally 
justified laws of war, in particular the principles of combatant equality and noncombatant 
immunity.   
The central challenge for the political approach underpinning orthodox jus in bello is 
to explain what happens to basic interpersonal moral demands—such as the prohibition on 
intentionally killing the innocent—in the context of war. This challenge does not arise for 
political approaches to justice. There, the typical approach is to use institutions to set a 
context within which we are permitted to act on our interpersonal moral reasons. Once a 
just background is in place, there is no further scope for a clash between institutional and 
interpersonal demands. For example, parents may show special concern towards their 
children, without worrying about their children being unfairly advantaged as a result. Just 
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background institutions would in fact prevent such unfair advantage from arising. In the 
context of war, however, this is not the case. Clashes between institutional and 
interpersonal demands are endemic. 
 The challenge is relatively easily met for noncombatant immunity. After all, even 
the most ardent revisionists are uneasy about their views’ radical implications for the 
permissibility of intentionally killing noncombatants. Everyone recognizes the intuitive pull 
of noncombatant immunity. So if the political account vindicates that intuitive pull, then 
that is all to the good.  
Combatant equality poses a more serious difficulty. Nobody can plausibly deny that 
profound moral reasons weigh against intentionally killing people who are justifiably 
defending their lives and homes, and against collaterally killing wholly uninvolved people in 
the pursuit of an unjust objective. We ordinarily consider these the weightiest moral 
reasons that there are. Why should the presence of an institutional scheme that licenses 
such killings make any difference to their permissibility?  
To answer this question in a manner that vindicates existing norms, political just-
war theorists must account for the authority of current international law (Christiano 
[2010]).15 In other words, they must explain why the mere fact that some act is prohibited 
(or permitted, required etc.) by morally justified laws of war gives the addressees of these 
laws a moral reason not to do it, even if it would be permissible at the bar of interpersonal 
morality. What is more, the substantive tenets of in bello orthodoxy could be justified only if 
the moral reason in question was not merely pro tanto but decisive, in a large enough set of 
cases. Vindicating such a strong conception of the authority of international law is a 
daunting task. Many political philosophers recognize that, even in the best states, 
accounting for a weaker pro tanto obligation to obey domestic law is hard (Simmons [1979]). 
And international society is a far cry from the ideal liberal state. Yet, short of a convincing 
account of the conditions under which international law has authority in the strong sense, 
and an argument showing that the existing laws of war satisfy those conditions, the 
normative priority that the political approach assigns to institutional demands remains 
unvindicated. 
That said, if political just war theorists fall short of defending the authority of 
international law, they might still salvage their approach by lowering its ambitions. On this 
interpretation, the morally justified laws governing the conduct of war apply to individuals 
only given that they have taken up their role as combatants and state leaders. These 




first place. Considerations external to the morality of the practice of war—e.g., 
fundamental interpersonal moral demands—determine whether that is the case. On this 
view, it remains true that combatants who fight unjust wars ought not to fight all things 
considered. The laws of jus in bello only set out necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for 
the moral permissibility of one’s actions in war. For just combatants, there is no conflict 
between interpersonal moral duties and the permissions and prohibitions attached to their 
institutional roles. For unjust combatants, such a conflict exists: the laws of war apply to 
them conditional on the breach of an interpersonal moral prohibition. Interpersonal 
morality prohibits combatants on the unjust side from participating in the practice of war. 
Yet, once they take up their role as combatants, they at least ought to obey the jus in bello 
(for a similar idea, see Dill and Shue [2012]; Shue [2013]).  
This reinterpretation of the political approach would make it more defensible, but 
would also render it less amenable to orthodox substantive conclusions. Indeed, so 
reinterpreted, the approach leads to first-order views not too far from those of revisionists. 
Some structural and substantive differences, though, would still remain. Structurally, 
political just-war theorists’ conclusions would still be reached via a distinctive line of 
argument, according to which principles for the conduct of war are ‘internal’ to a given 
practice, and do not adjudicate the question of whether one may participate in the practice 
in the first place. Substantively, proponents of the political approach might still be able to 
vindicate the moral significance of the laws of war for unjust combatants, even if abiding 
by them would not suffice to render their actions morally permissible.  For instance, they 
could point out that, when soldiers from different sides are symmetrically positioned with 
respect to the laws of war—in that they all endorse and follow them—their moral standing 
vis-à-vis each other changes. Suppose the soldiers of state A commit some interpersonal 
wrong—for example, fighting in an unjust war—that is allowed by international law, and 
that the same international law is also upheld by state B and its soldiers. If so, it would 
seem that by following the common legal system that binds both A and B, B and its 
soldiers lack standing to condemn the morally wrongful actions of the A-soldiers, given 
that they themselves abide by the rules licensing those kinds of actions.  
To conclude, our discussion reveals that, unless a compelling defense of the strong 
authority of international law becomes available, a political approach may fail to offer a 
plausible basis for vindicating orthodox substantive conclusions. Arguably, the most 





3.2 Challenges to the Non-Political Approach 
The non-political approach, recall, holds that the principles governing the design of the 
laws of war are derived from the principles governing the conduct of individual soldiers. 
On the simplest, purist version of this approach, the laws of war should mirror 
interpersonal morality (Rodin [2011]). We think that this view about institutional design 
should be rejected in general, and find it particularly problematic when adopted in 
conjunction with revisionists’ account of interpersonal morality.16 On this point, we agree 
with orthodox theorists like Shue, and revisionists like McMahan.  
The rejection of this view stems from the simple observation that the answers to 
the questions ‘What are the true moral principles and values?’ and ‘What institutional rules 
should be adopted to best realize them?’ need not always coincide (compare Cohen [2008: 
266]). It is an open question whether directly reproducing fundamental moral principles in 
the law will best instantiate the values underlying those principles in the relevant 
circumstances. This depends on both the content of the principles and the nature of the 
circumstances. 
 For example, having the laws of war entirely mirror the morality underlying 
revisionist jus in bello is potentially problematic. If, as is often the case, combatants on both 
sides believe themselves to be justified, they will hold themselves to the revisionist 
standards applying to just combatants, with the associated reduced immunity for civilians. 
This will predictably lead to the death of many more innocent individuals than under a 
different institutional scheme. Mirroring the revisionist morality of war in the laws of war is 
thus likely to be counterproductive, especially to the extent that the value of innocent lives 
is central to that very morality (McMahan [2008]; Shue [2008]). 
 Reproducing interpersonal moral demands in the laws of war would arguably be 
less problematic under a more orthodox-friendly account of what those demands are. Seth Lazar 
and Adil Haque have defended an account of this kind, according to which interpersonal 
moral demands are quite close to those embedded in the laws of war: combatant equality 
and noncombatant immunity (Lazar [2015]; Haque [Forthcoming]). Regarding the former, 
Lazar and Haque observe that, on the one hand, the moral protections that just combatants 
enjoy are somewhat less robust than those enjoyed by justified self-defenders in ordinary 
interpersonal conflicts. Unlike justified self-defenders, just combatants have voluntarily 
exposed themselves to the risk of harm, and as between those who have and have not 
chosen to put themselves in harm’s way, it is morally preferable to harm the former. This 




things equal pro tanto better that it be borne by the individuals who had most opportunity to 
avoid its coming about. Moreover, most combatants go to war recklessly, without 
examining the justice of their cause. If they happen to respect their adversaries’ rights, they 
do so only through good fortune. The protections enjoyed by unjust combatants, on the 
other hand, are somewhat more robust than those of unjustified attackers in interpersonal 
conflicts. Unjust combatants are typically in the same epistemic position as their just 
counterparts, and they often act out of reasonable partiality for their compatriots. 
Moreover, on each side of a war, many individual combatants fight permissibly, and many 
fight impermissibly—all wars involve just and unjust aims and, more narrowly, just and 
unjust operations. These facts together suggest that, although just and unjust combatants 
are not always morally on a par, they often are, so combatant equality might be a sensible 
approximation of the moral truth, given the difficulty of calibrating obligations and 
permissions to the precise normative standing of each combatant. 
Similarly, manifold arguments show that killing noncombatants in war is more 
seriously wrongful than killing combatants, which, combined with further premises, helps 
ground noncombatant immunity and other legal doctrines, like proportionality and 
necessity. In particular, noncombatants are more vulnerable than combatants, killing them 
involves running a greater risk of killing innocent victims than does killing combatants, and 
killing noncombatants typically involves an egregiously wrongful mode of agency, in which 
they are used as a mere means (these arguments are developed and defended in detail in 
Lazar [2015]). 
 Embedding this orthodox-friendly understanding of interpersonal moral demands 
in the laws of war would probably have less deleterious consequences than embedding 
revisionist moral principles. Indeed, the resulting laws of war would not be too different 
from those that currently exist, which already approximate—without yet perfectly 
tracking—what interpersonal morality requires on this account.   
 Acknowledging this fact, however, does not suffice to address our general concern 
about the ‘mirroring’ approach. Whether institutional rules should mirror interpersonal 
morality should be treated as an open question, to be answered a posteriori. Depending on 
the circumstances, in some cases the answer will be affirmative, and in other cases negative. 
What we object to is what one might call the ‘a priori mirroring’ approach; and nothing in 
the discussion so far addresses our objection. In light of this, let us turn to the second type 
of derivation of institutional demands from individual moral ones, namely that mediated by 




Like us, adherents of this approach are concerned that any attempt to mirror 
interpersonal morality in the laws of war might be counter-productive. On their view, we 
should develop principles to design the laws of war that are quite distinct from those of 
interpersonal morality, while still being sensitive to the values underlying it. Taking this 
kind of view, McMahan [2008] argues that the laws of war presuppose consequentialist 
foundations—they aim to minimize wrongful harm—while the morality of war is avowedly 
nonconsequentialist in structure. Yet, at the heart of both is a fundamental concern with 
the value of the lives of innocent individuals. 
This view could potentially let us have our demanding principles of interpersonal 
morality, without accepting their radical and likely problematic implications if implemented 
in international law. But of course this view must now explain what soldiers should do 
when moral and institutional demands for individuals conflict with one another. McMahan 
briefly argues that, when morality requires what the law permits or prohibits, and when 
morality prohibits what the law permits, soldiers should obey their moral duties. But when 
the law prohibits what morality permits, combatants should adhere to the law (McMahan 
[2008: 37-8]). Problematically, this discussion is neither exhaustive (it is silent on legal 
requirements, such as the requirement of due care, and obligations to obey lawful orders), 
nor does it have deep theoretical foundations. McMahan [2008] never explains why legal 
demands can override moral ones, except by appealing to consequentialist considerations 
that clash with the deontological approach to interpersonal morality he otherwise endorses 
(Lazar [2012]). 
Like advocates of the political approach, those who invoke principles of 
institutional regulation must explain under what circumstances/in what domain the international 
law of armed conflict has the kind of authority that can override combatants’ interpersonal 
moral demands. Yet, for the reasons we mentioned in connection with our discussion of 
the political approach, establishing the authority of international law is a difficult task to 
accomplish. 
However, one avenue for doing so unavailable to political just-war theorists might 
be open to their non-political counterparts. This consists in appealing to a broadly Razian 
justification for the authority of international law (Raz [1985]). Following the Razian 
approach, the authority of international law depends on whether treating its demands as 
authoritatively binding makes combatants and political leaders more likely to act on the 
(moral) reasons that independently apply to them. Since, on the non-political approach, 




reasons that apply to individuals, this Razian line of analysis is open to its proponents. On 
this view, the laws of war have authority when obeying their commands is more conducive 
to their addressees’ acting as morality requires than is following their own judgment. 
The difficulty for non-political revisionist theorists is that it is not clear when, if 
ever, the laws of war meet the aforementioned condition. If the moral reasons individuals 
ought to act on include a near-absolute prohibition on intentionally killing the innocent, 
then when they are not sure about the justice of their cause soldiers should simply refuse to 
fight. This is clearly a more accurate guide to abiding by interpersonal moral reasons than 
following laws of war that may quite clearly diverge from interpersonal morality. Although, 
structurally, revisionist adherents to the non-political approach could in principle invoke 
Raz’s justificatory strategy, doing so would probably still not allow them to vindicate the 
authority of international law.  
This strategy can be more fruitfully invoked by theorists who, like Lazar and 
Haque, defend an orthodox-friendly picture of the interpersonal moral demands applying 
to combatants in war. For these theorists, it will be true that following the law (as opposed 
to interpersonal morality directly) will often better allow combatants to comply with their 
moral duties. In those cases, the laws of war will have authority. By contrast, in cases where 
it is obvious that combatants may better comply with independent moral demands just by 
following their own judgment, international law will have no authority.17 Still, this view 
would fall short of vindicating jus in bello orthodoxy, since it allows for circumstances in 
which soldiers and leaders ought to act contrary to what international law requires. 
Once again, then, our discussion reveals that—in the absence of an adequate 
defense of the authority of international law—what looks like the most promising version 
of the non-political approach fails to vindicate just-war revisionism, and involves making 
some concessions to orthodox views. 
 
3.3 Concluding Remarks 
Much of the dispute between orthodox and revisionist just war theorists depends on what 
the correct account of the relationship between moral and institutional demands applying 
to individuals is. If orthodox theorists wish to vindicate combatant equality and non-
combatant immunity as exhaustive of the permissibility of combatants’ conduct in war, 
they must argue that the existing laws of war have legitimate authority. As we have 




If revisionists wish to uphold the interpersonal moral prohibition on killing the 
innocent, while not subscribing to the problematic ‘a priori mirroring approach’, they must 
explain why and when obedience to the laws of war affects one’s moral standing. This 
again requires either developing a theory of the authority of international law or, more 
modestly, of the normative significance of international law, short of authority.  
Without any ambition of solving these disputes, our discussion has suggested that 
the most plausible versions of political and non-political approaches to the just war 
vindicate positions that depart somewhat from just war orthodoxy and revisionism, 
occupying the middle ground between the two.  
We do, however, hope that our discussion has shown how progress in the first-
order dispute between revisionist and orthodox just war theorists can be aided by 
considering the second-order question of how the moral and institutional demands 
applying to individuals relate to each other.  
4. Feasibility Constraints and Just War Theory 
In this section, we first sketch the political theory discussion on feasibility constraints and 
the design of normative principles, then draw parallels with the contemporary just war 
theory debate. Once again, this new framing will help us illuminate that debate and make 
some substantive advances within it. 
4.1 Feasibility Constraints in Theorizing about Justice 
When attempting to act on our most cherished moral ideals, we often find that facts about 
human character and behavior, our empirical circumstances, and the perverse incentives 
that we face, make those ideals hard to implement successfully. We call these facts 
feasibility constraints. 18  Political theorists have, in recent years, expended much effort 
identifying which feasibility constraints should set the parameters for principles of justice 
that aim to deliver action-guiding prescriptions.19 Their views can be represented on a 
spectrum, from what might be called ‘utopian’ theorists at one end, to ‘realists’ at the other 
(Carens [1996]; Valentini [2012]).20 
Utopian theorists think that justice is unconstrained by the demands of feasibility 
(e.g., arguably, Cohen [2003]); realists think that all facts that render a principle even 
minimally unlikely to be successfully realized should be taken as parametric—that is, they 
should limit the scope of that principle’s application. Between these unpopular extremes, 




constraints, but they differ over the extent of those concessions. Inspired by vocabulary 
introduced by David Estlund [2008: ch. 14.], we distinguish between weakly and strongly 
concessive approaches. 
Weakly concessive approaches consider only a thin set of feasibility constraints 
relevant to theorizing about justice. Provided some action enjoined by a principle of justice 
is physically and psychologically possible for the agent, it can be required of him.21 Facts 
about physical and psychological possibility will depend on (i) the agents in question and 
(ii) the environment around them. Ascertaining what (i) and (ii) involve may seem relatively 
straightforward. For example, it may sometimes be physically impossible for a deaf person 
to act on the obligation ‘you ought to reply when your name is called out’. Similarly, it may 
be physically impossible for a well-meaning but desperately poor state to provide 
subsistence for all of its citizens.  
Other cases are less clear-cut. Imagine John is standing on the shore of a lake, and 
sees a small child drowning, not far from him (Singer [1972]). John knows how to swim, 
and can pull the child out without risking drowning; however, he is paralyzed by what he 
recognizes as an irrational fear of entering the lake. He developed this fear as a child, after 
his father died in a boating accident. Is it psychologically impossible for John to walk in 
and pull the child out? It is hard to say, but weakly concessive theories must explain when 
psychological debilities count as genuine feasibility constraints. 
Strongly concessive approaches emphasize not only facts about physical and 
psychological possibility, but also facts about what agents are likely to do given their 
preferences and dispositions (for a critique of these approaches see Estlund [2011]). To 
appreciate the difference, consider this prescription: ‘Every person ought to donate 50% of 
their income to the global poor, provided this is compatible with each still satisfying their 
basic needs’. Weakly concessive approaches could not object to this: though this 
prescription asks a lot, it is clearly physically and psychologically possible to donate half 
one’s income to others (barring exceptional circumstances or unusual pathologies). By 
contrast, on the strongly concessive approach, this prescription is indeed invalid, because it 
is so unlikely that people will comply with it. Given predictable selfishness and partiality, 
very few will be disposed to donate so much of their earnings, which is enough to 




4.2 Feasibility Constraints in Just War Theory 
The divide between weakly and strongly concessive approaches is again reproduced in the 
split between orthodox and revisionist just war theorists, and in a rather stark way. The 
former are strongly concessive, the latter are weakly concessive.  
 Orthodox theorists defend combatant equality and noncombatant immunity on 
strongly concessive grounds. The institutions governing armed conflict should not make 
demands that their addressees will predictably ignore. More specifically, as was briefly 
mentioned in the previous section, some facts about warfare, human nature, and our 
predictable moral failings, make revisionist laws of war highly unlikely to be observed.23 
First, the circumstances of warfare mean that combatants are rarely able to find 
out, given the time and resources available, whether their cause is just, or whether their 
targets are liable to be killed. Moreover, there may be reasonable disagreement about what 
makes a war just, so different combatants’ judgments will presuppose different standards. 
Rawls’ reflections on the ‘burdens of judgment’ apply here as elsewhere (Rawls [1996: 
Lecture II, sec. 2.]). And even if—counterfactually—most combatants could converge on 
the same standard of justice, find out whether the war they are fighting is just, and 
distinguish the liable from the nonliable, they would not be able to confine their attacks to 
the liable, given how the two groups are intermingled, and given how relatively 
indiscriminate military technology still is.  
Second, human nature is such that, arguably, the extreme exigencies of warfare, 
especially in bello, make adhering to strict moral norms psychologically impossible, or at any 
rate excessively onerous, for many combatants. Their own lives and the lives of their 
friends are immediately in danger; death and pain surround them; psychological trauma is, 
for many combatants, inevitable. This extreme stress reduces their ability to deliberate 
about the right course of action; it also almost certainly inclines them to reason more 
partially.  
Third, and perhaps most importantly, combatants will often convince themselves 
that they are fighting for a just cause, no matter how much of a cognitive leap that requires. 
Their leaders will aid this self-deception through propaganda, deceit, and misinformation.  
Together, these facts mean that if the laws of armed conflict rejected combatant 
equality and noncombatant immunity, then those laws would be, respectively, disregarded 
and brutally abused. If the law prohibits unjust combatants from fighting, they will fight 
nonetheless, whether because of the difficulty of knowing that their cause is unjust; or 




their cause; or because they convince themselves that their cause is just despite evidence to 
the contrary. Similarly, if the laws were to permit just combatants to intentionally kill liable 
noncombatants, they would predictably be abused. Many unjust combatants would 
arrogate to themselves the extra permissions reserved for just combatants (believing 
themselves justified), and many just combatants would take advantage of the additional 
permissions without adequate justification for doing so—in part, no doubt, because of the 
psychological exigencies of combat.  
If a critical mass of combatants disobey the laws of armed conflict, then those laws 
cannot minimize the (wrongful) harms involved in war. Laws cannot achieve their goals if 
they are ignored. So the laws should not make demands of people that they will, 
predictably, not fulfil. Facts about likely compliance constrain which institutions can 
justifiably govern armed conflict. Orthodox theorists are strongly concessive. 
 Revisionists, as already noted, focus primarily on interpersonal moral demands, 
and, unlike orthodox theorists, they are weakly concessive, as well as highly optimistic 
about what is psychologically possible for combatants at war. For revisionists, the pervasive 
uncertainty of war, psychological trauma, and predictable self-deception are at most 
problems of application. Normative principles are derived from sanitized hypothetical 
cases with none of these characteristics. 
Faced with the objection that their normative theorizing makes epistemic and 
psychological demands that normal combatants cannot meet, revisionists have a ready 
response: their demands govern whom combatants may kill, if they kill anyone. They can 
be satisfied either by killing only those who may permissibly be killed, or by not killing 
anyone at all. Although, for at least some combatants, it might be impossible to 
discriminate between the liable and the nonliable in war, it is certainly possible to adhere to 
the principle ‘kill only the liable’: simply kill no one. This would mean failing to fulfil any 
duties to defend the innocent. But provided one accepts a substantial asymmetry between 
doing and allowing harm, as most revisionists do, perhaps this is a tolerable result. 
Moreover, although stress and trauma might undermine some people’s agency in 
war, many combatants overcome their circumstances and oppose unjust actions in war, so 
why should we assume that all humans are incapable of opposing wars that are unjust 
simpliciter? Revisionists believe that many human beings can resist the corrupting effects 
of violence and war, and that, despite their survival instinct, they can adhere to norms that 
demand sacrificing their own lives, rather than take another person’s life to protect 




to that instinct are unlikely to be universally complied with. But for revisionists, predictable 
wrongdoing is no ground for removing interpersonal moral obligations we would 
otherwise have.  
5. Feasibility Constraints and Just War Theory: Implications  
As with the dispute over political and non-political approaches to the site of jus in bello, we 
again see that the controversy between orthodox and revisionist just war theorists derives, 
at least in part, from a deeper disagreement about feasibility constraints in normative 
theorizing. It is another proxy battle, which cannot be resolved without settling the second-
order dispute. However, we think that this task is easier for the feasibility question than for 
the site question, because revisionist and orthodox approaches can be reconciled. Not only 
are they fighting proxy battles; they are engaged in a phony war. Why? Because there is no 
uniquely correct set of feasibility constraints.  
Which constraints we should recognize depends on the site for which we are 
issuing prescriptions. Orthodox and revisionist just war theorists—for all their 
disagreement—actually endorse compatible approaches, and each is broadly right about the 
role of feasibility for the site that they consider. Orthodox theorists are right that, when 
designing institutions, we should be strongly concessive. But revisionists are also right that, 
at the level of interpersonal morality, we should be only weakly concessive.  
The key point is simple. When deciding what I, as an individual, ought to do, I 
cannot use my moral weakness as an excuse, because—setting genuine pathologies aside—
I have sufficient control of whether or not I am morally weak, and of how I behave more 
generally. By contrast, we cannot reasonably expect the same level of control on the part of 
an institutional system, no matter how effectively enforced its rules are. It is not in the 
law’s power to secure compliance with its content, independently of what that content is. 
How likely individuals are to obey given rules therefore makes a difference to what a 
system of rules can achieve in any given circumstance Weinberg []; Valentini [Forthcoming]. 
For this reason, institutional—as opposed to purely moral—rules for individual conduct 
ought, in the main, to take into account individuals’ likely non-compliance.  
While the strongly vs. weakly concessive attitudes of orthodox and revisionist just 
war theorists at the institutional and the interpersonal level are laudable, some objections to 
both views still arise from thinking about feasibility constraints. In what follows, we set 





5.1 Challenges to Orthodox Theorists’ Treatment of Feasibility Constraints 
Orthodox theorists are arguably too concessive in their understanding of which institutional 
norms might win assent. For example, one might have thought, during the Second World 
War, that any legal convention prohibiting intentional attacks on noncombatants would be 
infeasible to implement, and yet over the twentieth century attacks on noncombatants 
became taboo, at least among liberal democracies (Kahl [2007]). In the same spirit, we 
should not be too pessimistic about the prospects for further reform of the laws of war. 
We should endorse and pursue concrete institutional proposals that might materially 
improve the likelihood of unjust combatants both finding out about the impermissibility of 
their wars, and acting on that knowledge. 
For example, whatever the shortcomings of McMahan’s proposal for an 
international court of jus ad bellum, using advances in technology and the increasing reach of 
international organizations to provide more public information about the proximate causes 
of war (along the lines already attempted by the OSCE, for example in South Ossetia in 
2008) increases combatants’ prospects of discovering whether their causes are just 
(McMahan [2014]). Making greater provision within national armies for selective 
conscientious refusal could also materially diminish predictable voluntary wrongdoing 
(McMahan [2013]). New technologies, such as unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with 
high-powered cameras, promise to make both distinguishing and discriminating between 
the liable and nonliable more tractable, as well as mitigating at least the antecedent 
psychological stress that makes conscientious action by soldiers in conventional wars so 
difficult (Strawser [2010]). Though international law advances glacially, it does advance, and 
orthodox just war theorists should ensure they guide, rather than hinder, that progress. 
 
5.2 Challenges to Revisionist Theorists’ Treatment of Feasibility Constraints 
Revisionist just war theorists are too inattentive to real-world constraints characterizing the 
human condition in war, and to uncertainty and psychological stress in particular. We can 
indeed always abide by the duty not to kill nonliable people, by simply refusing to fight, but 
this is like saying that a blind person can adhere to the prohibition ‘you must not cross 
roads when the red man is lit’ by never crossing roads. If they give us no more guidance 
than this as to what to do given the uncertainty and stress characterizing war, then our only 
option is to endorse pacifism.24 
Let us begin by considering uncertainty. Combatants at war are typically unable to 




they could do so, they could not discriminate between them; that is, confine their attacks 
only to the liable (Lazar [2010]; Dill and Shue [2012]). Invariably, they are also uncertain 
whether their cause is just, and whether it will be proportionate and necessary. If they are 
told that they may intentionally kill only the liable, when doing so is necessary and 
proportionate to the service of a just cause, then their only way to avoid risking breaching a 
near-absolute prohibition on intentionally killing the innocent is to refuse to fight. 
Although pacifism should remain a live option, most just war theorists want to offer a 
middle ground between realism and pacifism, to explain why common sense is right, and 
some wars can permissibly be fought, despite their costs. This means explaining how to 
apply revisionist just war theory in the context of uncertainty.25  
Without aiming to be comprehensive, we can illustrate two approaches available to 
revisionists who wish to extend their theories in these ways. One involves first identifying 
all of the objective moral reasons, and then choosing a decision rule that allows us to 
optimize compliance with our objective moral reasons, given our uncertainty (Lazar 
[2016]). Paradigmatically, this means applying decision theory to our moral reasons. For 
any given decision problem, we first identify the options available to the agent, then the 
possible states that the world might be in, and the outcomes of those options dependent 
on those states. We assign probabilities to the states given that one acts, and moral worth 
(e.g., ‘utilities’) to the outcomes, sum the products of those two values for all possible 
outcomes from the option, and choose the option that maximizes expected moral worth.  
On most accounts this is our best tool for decision-making under uncertainty, but 
it poses distinctive problems for just war theory, given its apparently consequentialist cast, 
and the avowedly nonconsequentialist approach to ethics of most just war theorists—
certainly of those in the revisionist camp. It also raises its own problems—after all, we 
aimed to provide useful advice in the circumstances of war, but doing expected ‘moral 
worth’ (e.g., utility) calculations is often no easier than working out the objectively right 
thing to do. Identifying salient outcomes and states, assigning moral worth to the outcomes 
and probabilities to the states will often be an inordinately complex task. Some might even 
question whether we can assign probabilities in an endeavor as unpredictable and complex 
as warfare. 
The second approach is to argue that first-order moral reasons govern what is 
permissible given our uncertainty, and reject the idea that we need a decision rule to apply 
our theory of objective morality. On this view, we would need to work out, for example, a 




consequences are permissible just in case they are neither reckless nor negligent. We might 
also develop an evidence- or belief-relative theory of rights, according to which my claims 
against others are in part a function of the evidence available to them, or what they believe 
to be the case (Ferzan [2005]; Zimmerman [2008]; Frowe [2010]). Or we could perhaps 
adopt Aboodi, Boorer, and Enoch’s suggestion that whether a harm counts as intentional 
can depend on the agent’s beliefs about whether the target was liable to that harm (Aboodi 
et al. [2008]; see also McMahan [2011]). The challenge for those who favor this approach is 
to give a detailed account of those reasons, and to explain both why they cannot be simply 
integrated into the first approach, and what we should do when our first-order reasons 
governing action under uncertainty must be combined with, or conflict with, our reasons to 
optimize compliance with objective norms. 
Lastly, and as anticipated, revisionist just war theorists should re-examine their 
views on whether psychological stress and trauma can defeat obligations that we might 
otherwise have. The standing assumption is that the unique exigencies of war do not 
diminish the constraints that govern belligerent practice. But in other contexts, we often 
think of pathological psychological debilities as being, as Estlund puts it, ‘requirement-
blocking’ (Estlund [2011]). Of course, this is easier to explain when the requirements are, as 
in the drowning case presented earlier, positive requirements to aid others. In war, our 
central focus is on the ethics of killing, and it is hard to come up with cases outside of war 
in which a putative duty not to kill is blocked by the psychological stress faced by the duty-
bearer.  
But the revisionists tell combatants fighting for an unjust cause that they are 
morally required to lay down their weapons, even if that means sacrificing their lives. 
Consider a terrified soldier, worn down by weeks or months of near-misses, seeing his 
friends and enemies arbitrarily cut down one after the other, who now faces attack. It 
seems relatively easy to think of cases in which it is psychologically impossible for such an 
individual to lay down his arms and let himself be killed. And we can perhaps go further. Is 
it psychologically possible, in such a case, to do nothing to defend yourself? Grant the 
revisionists that mere fear for one’s life cannot block the requirement not to kill an 
innocent person. But could it perhaps block the requirement not to subject an innocent 
person to a certain level of risk? Perhaps the psychological impossibility of doing nothing 
might license this combatant to spray suppressive fire in the direction of his adversaries, in 
the hopes of pinning them down and preventing them from dealing the decisive blow. We 




revisionist just war theorists should think more carefully about cases like these, which 
illustrate how the psychological impossibility of adhering to some constraints might block 
their application in war.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have argued that revisionist and orthodox just war theorists have fought 
proxy battles: their first-order disagreements over substantive questions in just war 
theory—in particular combatant equality and noncombatant immunity—derive, at least 
partly, from second-order disputes over the nature and purpose of just war theory. 
Bringing these debates to the surface shows both how these different camps have been 
talking past each other, and how we can make advances in the debate and, perhaps, 
reconcile their views.  
In particular, we have argued that normative theorizing about war should concern 
itself both with the grounds on which the institutions governing armed conflict are morally 
justified, and with the moral demands that apply to individual actors in war. The interesting 
question is how the two relate to each other, and we have mapped out the relevant 
possibilities, and their virtues and vices. We have also argued that implicit disputes over 
feasibility constraints underpin orthodox theorists’ concessive attitude to unjust 
combatants who fight despite their interpersonal moral requirements not to, as well as 
revisionists’ moral rigorism. In this dispute, we think a happy accommodation between 
revisionists and orthodox theorists should be possible: when designing institutions to 
govern war, we should consider all kinds of predictable non-compliance; in the principles 
governing individual actors, only physical and psychological impossibility should be 
parametric. Revisionists have not adequately adapted their theories to accommodate these 
considerations, but there is nothing to prevent them from doing so. And once they do, the 
gulf between their prescriptions and those issued by orthodox theorists may shrink, 
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